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Taxation: Liberal Standard Proposed for Deducting
Charitable Contributions to Religious Schools
Plaintiff taxpayer attempted to deduct' from his taxable net
income as a "contribution or gift" to a qualified organization2
the $2241 he paid to a Talmud Torah school "in consideration
of ' pre-Bar Mitzvah training for his three children. The school
did not absolutely require the payment;4 the United Jewish Fund
subsidized tuition for children whose parents were unable to pay.
The Minnesota tax court allowed the deduction, finding that
the school provided only religious educational services, indistin-
guishable from other services normally provided by a church or
synagogue to its members. Because a general donation by a
member who receives such services has uniformly been held tax
1. The Minnesota income tax statute refers to the subtraction for
a qualifying expenditure as a credit against taxable income. MINN.
STAT. § 290.21(1) (1976). In response to this statutory terminology, the
Minnesota supreme court said, "Although the statute actually uses the
language 'credits' against 'taxable net income,' in order to avoid con-
fusion with 'tax credits' or credits against tax liability, this opinion
refers to a credit against taxable net income as a deduction." Gotlieb
v. Commissioner of Taxation, 245 N.W.2d 244, 245 n.2 (Minn. 1976). This
Comment will follow the same usage.
2. MnNv. STAT. § 290.21 (1976). The relevant portion of the
statute reads:
Subdivision 1. The taxes imposed by this chapter shall be on
or measured by, as the case may be, the taxable net income less
the following credits....
Subd. 3. An amount for contribution or gifts made within
the taxable year:
(b) to or for the use of any community chest, corporation,
organization, trust, fund, association, or foundation located in and
carrying on substantially all of its activities within the state,
organized and operating exclusively for religious, charitable,
public cemetery, scientific, literary, artistic, or educational pur-
poses, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals,
no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any
private stockholder or individual.
3. Gotlieb v. Commissioner of Taxation, 245 N.W.2d 244, 245
(Minn. 1976). The taxpayer stipulated that his payment was "in con-
sideration of" the training.
4. The school sent letters to parents telling them the cost of the
education. Statements were then sent to the parents unless they re-
quested an interview to explain that they were unable or unwilling to
make a payment.
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deductible, the court ruled that the form of the "contribution"
as tuition did not call for different treatment.5 The Supreme
Court of Minnesota reversed, holding that any payment made
"in consideration of" educational services could not be a gift
within the meaning of the statute.
Five of the nine justices, however, joined in a concurring
opinion which stated that a deduction for voluntary6 payments to
a school providing only religious educational services should be
allowed if the payments were nonrefundable 7 and created no
legally enforceable obligation in the organization." Gotlieb v.
Commissioner of Taxation, 245 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Minn. 1976)
(Rogosheske, J., concurring). Because this concurrence by a
majority of the court proposed so unusual a test for deductibility,
this Comment will analyze the several problems inherent in that
test.
It is well settled that a payment made for legal consideration
is not a charitable contribution or gift.9 Where, however, a pay-
ment is not explicitly acknowledged to be "in consideration of,"
5. Gotlieb v. Commissioner of Taxation, mix. STATE TAX REP.
(CCH) 200-712 (1975), rev'd, 245 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. 1976).
6. In this context the term "voluntary" means that any education
received by the taxpayer's children would not be conditioned on his
payment.
7. Although "nonrefundable" seems synonymous with "no legally
enforceable obligation," the concurrence apparently included the addi-
tional requirement out of an abundance of caution, in order to cover
situations in which a taxpayer might claim that the donee school had no
legally enforceable obligation to provide educational services, but where
the school nonetheless had a history of refunding the payment upon the
occurrence of a certain contingency, for example, when a taxpayer's
child was expelled. Thus the test could be construed to mean that a de-
duction for voluntary payments to a school that provides only religious
educational services and has never refunded such payments should be
allowed if the payments create no legally enforceable obligation in the
organization.
8. Had Gotlieb not stipulated that his payment was "in considera-
tion of" the educational service rendered by the Talmud Torah school,
the deduction probably would have been allowed. See 245 N.W.2d at 247.
Although the concurrence limited its test to "payments to and for the
use of a Talmud Torah school," id., the most reasonable interpretation
of the opinion is not that the court intended generally to distinguish other
types of religious educational services, but rather that it was addressing
the particular facts of Gotlieb.
9. Such a payment is not a gift at common law, see, e.g., Roske v.
Ilykanyics, 232 Minn. 383, 45 N.W.2d 769 (1951); Suske v. Struka, 229
Minn. 409, 39 N.W.2d 745 (1949), nor for purposes of the federal charit-
able contribution deduction statute, see, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v.




but the taxpayer nonetheless appears to have received some
benefit from the recipient organization, courts have examined the
facts surrounding the "contribution" to determine whether it is
an allowable deduction under section 170 of the Internal Revenue
Code.10 In DeJong v. Commissioner," for example, taxpayers
claimed as a charitable deduction the amount paid to a school
run by a nonprofit Christian society. The tax court held that
$400 of the amount claimed-the stipulated cost of educating the
taxpayer's two children who attended the school-was in the
nature of tuition paid for educational services and therefore a
nondeductible family expense.12 The Ninth Circuit, relying on
the definition of "gift" formulated by the United States Supreme
Court in Commissioner v. Duberstein,1 3 affirmed, stating:
The value of a gift may be excluded from gross income only if
the gift proceeds from a "detached and disinterested generosity"
or "out of affection, admiration, charity or like impulses" and
must be included if the claimed gift proceeds primarily from
"the constraining force of any moral or legal duty or from the
incentive of anticipated benefit of an economic nature." We
must conclude that such criteria are clearly applicable to a
charitable deduction under § 170.14
10. Since the transaction contemplated by the phrase "contribution
or gifts" in the Minnesota statute is the same as that in section 170 (c) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and since there were no Minnesota
cases interpreting that language, the Gotlieb court recognized the applic-
ability of federal decisions to state law, 245 N.W.2d at 246. The federal
statutory terms "gift" and "contribution" have been held to be synony-
mous. Channing v. United States, 4 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 67
F.2d 986 (1st Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 686 (1934).
11. 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962).
12. Harold DeJong, 36 T.C. 896, aff'd, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962).
A "personal, living or family expense" such as tuition is expressly not
deductible under both the federal and state statutes. I.R.C. § 262; MINN.
STAT. § 290.10 (1) (1976). Thus, when a taxpayer makes a payment to a
qualified charitable organization expecting and receiving benefit in
return, see notes 13-17 infra and accompanying text, the courts hold that
the payment in substance is more like an "expense" than a "gift." It is
likely that Congress in enacting the charitable contribution deduction
statute, War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201 (2), 40 Stat. 330, as an in-
centive to charitable giving, see 55 CONG. Rnc. 6728 (remarks of Senator
Hollis), was assuming that a gift was by definition a transfer for which
there was no other economic incentive.
13. 363 U.S. 278 (1960). Duberstein dealt with the definition of
"gift" under the federal statute excluding gifts from gross income. See
I.R.C. § 102.
14. DeJong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373, 379 (9th Cir. 1962).
The following cases have followed the Duberstein-DeJong test: Winters
v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972); Karl D. Pettit, 61 T.C.
634 (1974); James Summers, 43 T.C.M. (P-H) [ 74,162 (1974); Charles
0. Grinslade, 59 T.C. 566 (1973); Eugene G. Feistman, 30 T.C.M. (CCH)
590 (1971); Donald W. Fausner, 55 T.C. 620 (1971); Harold E. Wolfe, 54
T.C. 1707 (1970); Edward A. Murphy, 54 T.C. 249 (1970); John J.L.
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In Winters v. Commissioner,15 the Second Circuit, although
phrasing the test differently, applied the same principle. The
court held that a voluntary payment to a parochial school was
not a gift under the tax statute because "induced in substantial
part" by anticipation of economic gain.'6 Thus, under the pre-
vailing interpretation of the federal charitable deduction pro-
vision, whether a payment is a gift depends on the taxpayer's
expectation as indicated by the circumstances of the transaction.
The task of the fact finder is to determine "what the basic reason
for the taxpayer's conduct was in fact-the dominant reason
that explains his action in making the transfer."' 7
Ryan, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 1120 (1969); James A. McLaughlin, 51 T.C. 233(1968), affd, 69-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9467 (1st Cir. 1969); Jordan
Perlmutter, 45 T.C. 311 (1966); S.M. Howard, 39 T.C. 833 (1963).
15. 468 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972).
16. Id. at 781. The court characterized DeJong as holding that the
taxpayer's "contributions were induced in substantial part by the bene-
fits which the parents anticipated from the enrollment of their children."
Id. (emphasis added). This formulation seems to express most clearly
the basic inquiry under the subjective test-whether the anticipation of
benefit. was an important factor in a. taxpayer's decision to make a pay-
ment in the first instance or his decision concerning the amount of the
payment. Under the "substantial inducement" qualification, a deduction
would be allowed where it was found .that the "anticipation of benefit"
was such an insignificant motivating factor that the taxpayer would
have made the same payment in any case.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue recently has begun to phrase
the standard in terms of the taxpayer's "reasonable expectation" of
economic benefit rather than actual anticipation. Rev. Rul. 232, 1976-1
C.B. 106 (emphasis added); Rev. Rul. 506, 1972-2 C.B. 106. No court has
adopted the Commissioner's version of the standard.
17. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 286 (1960).
The First Circuit, in Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1000 (1st
Cir. 1972), adopted a different approach, stating that payments to
qualifying organizations are not deductible "if to any substantial extent,
offset" by the value of services given in return. Id. at 1002. The "sub-
stantially offset" standard was offered as a remedy to the purported
problems in the "subjective" Duberstein-DeJong rule. The Oppewal
court, following Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d
146 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 976 (1967), maintained that if the
subjective test literally required an attitude of detached and disinterested
generosity or motives of affection, respect, or admiration, then such
"bad" or indifferent motives for making a contribution as a desire for
community goodwill, or to gain prestige, avoid taxes, or salve the con-
science could defeat a deduction that otherwise would qualify. See also
Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 421-23 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Comment,
Disinterested Generosity: An Emerging Criteria of Deductibility Under
Section 170, 1968 UTAH L. REv. 475, 478.
That contention misrepresents the meaning of the so-called sub-jective standard as interpreted by the courts. It is not a mind reading
test. As stated by the Ninth Circuit:
The inquiry into motive and purpose here does more than
probe the subjective attitude of the donors and the extent to
[Vol. 61:887
CASE COMMENT
A standard that focuses on the recipient, allowing a deduc-
tion regardless of the taxpayer's anticipation of benefit so long
as the organization incurs no legally enforceable obligation to
render services in return, has never been clearly approved by
any court. There is, however, some support for such a rule. In
which public spirited and charitable benevolence prompted
their action. The inquiry serves to expose the true nature of the
transaction: that, as the jury found, the 'gift' . . . was in ex-
pectation of the receipt of certain specific direct economic bene-
fits within the power of the recipient to bestow directly or in-
directly, which otherwise might not be forthcoming.
Stubbs v. United States, 428 F.2d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1009 (1971). See also Sedam v. United States, 518 F.2d 242 (7th
Cir. 1975). ,
The most reasonable interpretation of the "subjective" standard,
borne out by the cases, is that detached and disinterested generosity
means the absence of any legal, moral, or economic reason for the trans-
fer. For instance, in three cases citing the detached and disinterested
generosity language where the court disallowed the deduction, the tax-
payer anticipated educational services for his children in returri for pay-
ment, Winters v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972); DeJong v.
Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962); Donald W. Fausner, 55 T.C.'
620 (1971). See also Harold E. Wolfe, 54 T.C. 1707 (1970) (deduction dis-
allowed where taxpayer transfers his interest in a water and sewer sys-
tem to a village in anticipation of the undertaking* to maintain and
operate it); S.M. Howard, 39 T.C. 833 (1963) (deduction disallowed
where taxpayer anticipates receiving a position on a hospital staff in
return for his payment). The opinion by the Minnesota court in Got-
lieb correctly interpreted and applied the Duberstein-DeJong rule.
"The antithesis of payments which proceed from a detached and disin-
terested generosity is payments made by a taxpayer in consideration of
economic value flowing back to him." 245 N.W.2d at 246.
The fact-bound, essentially, objective nature of the standard was
illustrated in Dubersten itself where the Court allocated to the trier of
fact the primary responsibility to deal with "[t]he non-technical nature
of the statutory standard, the close relationship of it to the data of prac-
tical human experience, and the multiplicity of relevant factual ele-
ments." 363 U.S. at 289. Thus, where the fact finder determines that
the taxpayer's payment is "substantially offset" by an economic benefit
from the donee, it is not unreasonable to infer that the taxpayer's
payment was substantially induced by his "anticipation of the benefit."
Since actual receipt of economic benefit is the key element from which
motive has been inferred, the deduction is likely to be equally available
under either the subjective or objective test.
Although the results in =ost cases are unlikely to differ under
either the subjective or objective test, in certain cases the verbal formu-
lation may make a difference. Assume, for example, that a taxpayer
set up a foundation to make scholarship grants through a board of
trustees, and a scholarship was awarded to the taxpayer's child
on the usual merit criteria. On these facts, because the taxpayer's
payment to the foundation was offset in part by a benefit received, the
objective test would require that the deduction be reduced by the amount
of the scholarship. Under the subjective test, on the other hand, the facts
support a finding that anticipation of the benefit to his child was not a
substantial inducement to the taxpayer to make the payment. Therefore,
1977]
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Wardwell's Estate v. Commissioner,18 the taxpayer claimed a
deduction based on the amount she pledged to endow a room in a
rest home before she entered that institution. The tax court
disallowed the deduction, holding that her final payment under
the pledge, made the day before she entered the home, was in
anticipation of preferential admission and a reduced room rate.19
The Eighth Circuit reversed, but the basis of the decision is un-
clear. The court first appeared to find that the taxpayer did
not anticipate or receive benefit in return for her contribution,
20
but then went beyond this narrow factual holding to declare:
Under the facts above stated, to hold that the room endow-
ment payment made by Mrs. Wardwell was from "motive" and
"expectation" of a beneficial nature, is to "confound 'motive'
with (legal) 'consideration' and 'expectation' with 'legal
rights'-and-- -embodies tests for the recognition of charitable
gifts" which is not "supported by the Court's own findings of
fact." 21
the "donor's deduction for-his payment to the foundation should be
allowed without reduction by the amount of the scholarship. See
Edward N. Chase,I.9 B..A.M.(P-H) 1 40,142 (1940) (deduction allowed
when taxpayer's nephew received the scholarship).
It would-be a rare case in which a deduction would be disallowed
because the trier of fact found "anticipation" without finding actual
benefit. Because of the difficulties of proving the anticipation of a
benefit that was never received, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
would be unlikely to challenge a deduction in such a case. But at least
one court using a subjectiv&test has left open this possibility:
Taxpayers complain that in fact the dedication [of a portion
of their commercial property for a public road] has not in-
creased the value of their property; that the allegedly antici-
pated economic benefits have failed to materialize, and that the
record makes this clear. This, however, is not the test. Tax-
payer's subsequent disappointment in the ultimate monetary
value of the benefits sought and received cannot affect the situa-
tion.
Stubbs v. United States, 428 F.2d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1009 (1971) (deduction denied where court found both actual
benefit and anticipation of benefit).
18. 301 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1962).
19. Wardwell's Estate v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 443 (1960), rev'd,
301 F.2d 632. (8th Cir. 1962). While a resident at the home, Mrs. Ward-
well paid the standard rate for care and maintenance, plus extra charges
for infirmary care. Unlike those who did not endow a room, however,
she did not pay $30 a month to the home's building fund. 301 F.2d at
637. Those residents who could not afford the payment to the building
fund were not required to pay it.
20. The tax court's findings of fact were overturned as clearly
erroneous on the grounds that (1) documents accompanying the transfer
indicated that the taxpayer did not execute the pledge in anticipation of
preferential admission; and (2) because she paid the same charge as
other patients for care and maintenance, it was incorrect to hold that
she "benefitted" from a reduced room rate. 301 F.2d at 636, 638.
21. Id. at 638 (quoting Wardwell's Estate v. Commissioner, 35
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The cited language, although confusing, implies that, contrary
to the Duberstein-DeJong rule, expectations are irrelevant if the
parties do not exchange legal consideration, a position that has
not been seriously considered since. In DeJong, the Ninth Cir-
cuit stated, without elaboration, that Wardwell was "inapposite"
to the issues in dispute there.2 2 The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue has also unambiguously disapproved the implications of
Wardwell's "legal rights" language.
23
The majority opinion in Gotlieb v. Commissioner of Taxa-
tion adopted the Duberstein-DeJong standard, concluding that
a payment flatly stipulated to be "in consideration of" religious
training could not qualify as a charitable contribution. The tax-
payer clearly expected and received benefit equal in value to the
payments.
The antithesis of payments which proceed from a detached
and disinterested generosity is payments made by a taxpayer in
consideration of economic value flowing back to him. When a
taxpayer gives to a qualifying charitable institution, to the ex-.
tent his payment is a gift he retains no legally enforceable right
to demand value in return. In the case at bar it was stipulated
that the payments were made "in consideration of" the train-
ing provided by -the Talmud Torah School. It follows that if
the school had accepted the taxpayer's payments on behalf of
his children and then refused to provide services to those chil-
dren, the taxpayer could compel a refund of his money. This
is not a characteristic of a contribution or gift as contemplated
by Minn.St. 290.21, subd. 3 (b).24
T.C. 443, 450 (1960) (Pierce, J., dissenting), rev'd, 301 F.2d 632 (8th Cir.
1962)). See also Marshall v. Welch, 197 F. Supp. 874 (S.D. Ohio 1961);
Wagner v. Lethert, 67-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9229 (D. Minn. 1967).
22. 309 F.2d at 379.
23. Although finding that in Wardwell "there was no direct show-
ing . . . that such payment was required to procure [taxpayer's] admis-
sion then or that the home thereafter charged and collected less for her
regular care and maintenance than it would have otherwise charged
her," Rev. Rul. 506, 1972-2 C.B. 106, the Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue announced his disagreement with Wardwell "insofar as it can be
construed as holding that nothing short of a legally enforceable right
to obtain a return benefit will preclude a given transfer from being a
gift under section 170 of the Code." Id.
There is some indication that Congress also rejected the rule that
"expectations" are not to be considered in defining a gift. A congres-
sional report on the 1954 Internal Revenue Code defined "gifts" as "those
contributions which are made with no expectation of a financial return
commensurate with the amount of the gift." H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. A44 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 196(1954) (discussing distinction between business and charitable contri-
bution deductions).
24. 245 N.W.2d at 246 (footnote omitted),
1977]
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The concurring opinion seized on the language quoted above and
turned it around, arguing that a deduction should be allowed
where "it can be shown that the payment is not refundable, the
school undertakes no legally enforceable obligation to accept and
instruct the child, and the educational service provided by the
school is purely religious in character. '25
Under this standard, if the trier of fact concluded that the
donee undertook no legally enforceable obligation, it would be
unnecessary to examine. the circumstances of the transaction to
determine whether the primary purpose for the transfer was
nonetheless the taxpayer's anticipation of economic benefit.20
Thus, the concurring opinion, without citation of authority or
reasoned argument, approved a standard for charitable deductions
that is contrary to, and more liberal than, the accepted interpre-
tation of section 170.
The concurrence also appeared to limit the application of its
more liberal standard to cases in which the payment was made
to an organization providing purely religious educational services.
This raises serious questions of improper statutory interpretation
and violation of constitutional principles.
Like the federal statute, Minnesota's charitable contribution
provision qualifies organizations to receive tax deductible contri-
butions when they serve, inter alia, "religious, charitable, public
cemetery, scientific, literary, artistic, or educational" 27 purposes.
This list of qualifying organizations provides no reasonable basis
for a court to distinguish among them, disallowing, for example,
a deduction for a "contribution" made to a secular school quali-
fied under the statute as an educational organization, while al-
lowing a deduction for a "contribution" made under the same
circumstances to a Talmud Torah school operating exclusively
for religious purposes. The statutory language clearly indicates
that the deductibility of contributions should be governed by a
uniform standard. Moreover, special treatment for payments
25. Id. at 247 (Rogosheske, J., concurring).
26. Under a "legally enforceable obligation" standard the deduc-
tions claimed and disallowed in DeJong, Oppewal, and Winters would
have been allowable. In each case the tuition payments were volun-
tary, and the taxpayers' children could have attended school even
had no payments been made. Similarly, there is no suggestion in those
cases that the parents would have been legally entitled to a refund had
their children failed to receive the education. See Oppewal v. Commis-
sioner, 468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972); Winters v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d
778 (2d Cir. 1972); DeJong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir.
1962).
27. MINN. STAT. § 290.21(3) (b) (1976).
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made to organizations providing purely religious educational ser-
vices would violate the first amendment prohibition against the
establishment of religion. 28  The establishment clause requires
that government activity have a secular purpose.29 It must not
have the "primary effect" of advancing or inhibiting religion,30
and its administration must not involve excessive governmental
entanglement with religion.3 1
Allowing tax exemptions for religious organizations on the
same footing as other nonprofit organizations is constitutional
under this standard. In Walz v. Tax Commission32 the United
States Supreme Court stated that to strike down such statutes
would increase government entanglement with religion, possibly
involving religious organizations in tax valuation of their prop-
erty, tax liens, and tax foreclosures.3 3  In addition, the Court
28. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion. . . ." U.S.'CoNsT. amend. I. The establishment clause applies
to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
29. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). In Epperson the Court struck down an
Arkansas statute that made teaching Darwin's theory of evolution in
public schools unlawful because it was clear that 'the campaign to
secure adoption of the statute was religiously motivated, 393 U.S. at
108 n.16, and the 'state had not given any secular rationale for the
statute, id. at 107.
30. See, e.g., Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Committee for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756. (1973); Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
31. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
Generally this three part test is applied by asking each question in order.
See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Meek v. Pit-
tenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Com-
mittee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
Thus if a nonsecular legislative purpose is found, there will be no need
to proceed to an analysis of "effect" or "entanglement." Legislative state-
ments of secular purpose, however, are usually taken at face value. See
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 363; Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. at 829-30;
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at
773-74. Most of the recent cases have been decided on the presence or
absence of the provision's "primary effect" in advancing or inhibiting
religion, or the extent to which the statutory provision will foster ex-
cessive government entanglement with religion. See generally Note,
Establishment Clause Analysis of Legislative and Administrative Aid to
Religion, 74 CoLum. L. REV. 1175, 1180-81 (1974); Comment, Constitu-
tional Law: Public Aid to Parochial Schools Held Unconstitutional, 58
MnN. L. REv. 657 (1974).
32. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
33. Id. at 674-76. In determining whether excessive government
involvement existed in Walz, the Court noted:
The test is inescapably one of degree. Either course, taxation of
churches or exemption, occasions some degree of involvement
1977]
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pointed out that the tax exemption provision benefits a large
number of secular nonprofit organizatons, and thus does not have
the "primary effect" of either advancing or inhibiting religion.
3 4
The Court also noted that it was not insignificant that the exemp-
tion had a long history.3 5
In contrast, a system of tax credits for tuition paid to non-
public schools does not meet the constitutional test. In Committee
for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,3 the Su-
preme Court struck down a New York tax credit provision,37
holding that since the credits did not apply to a broad class of
organizations, but only to nonpublic schools, the majority of
which are sectarian, their primary effect was the advancement of
religion.38 The Court also pointed out that, unlike tax exemptions
for religious organizations themselves, the system of tax credits in
Nyquist increased rather than minimized government entangle-
ment with religion.39 Finally, the Court noted that, unlike the
with religion. Elimination of exemption would tend to expand
the involvement of government by giving rise to tax valuation of
church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct con-
frontations and conflicts t.hat follow in the train of those legal
processes.
Id. at 674: See also Note, Constitutionality of State Property Tax Ex-
emption for Religious Property, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 118 (1971).
The Court also noted that additional church-state involvement would
be threatened by church tax support of government. The Court stated:
"We cannot ignore the instances in history when church support of
government led to the kind of involvement we seek to avoid." 397
U.S. at 675.
34. Id. at 673. See also id. at 696-97 (Harlan, J., concurring); Com-
mittee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794-
95 (1973); Comment, supra note 31, at 666.
35. 397 U.S. at 677-80. The Court noted that although "[it is ob-
viously correct that no one acquires a vested or protected right in viola-
tion of the Constitution by long use," the continued allowance of the tax
exemption had not "given the remotest sign of leading to an established
church or religion." Id. at 678.
36. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
37. 1972 N.Y. Laws ch. 414. The statute provided for state aid
for "maintenance and repair" of facilities at nonpublic schools, reim-
bursement of up to $100 or 50% of tuition to low-income parents of
children attending the schools, and a tax benefit which functionally re-
sembled a tax "credit" to higher income parents.
38. 413 U.S. at 793-94. The Court found that the purposes of the
statute as stated by the New York legislature, to preserve "a healthy
and safe educational environment for all of its school children," to pro-
mote "pluralism and diversity among its public and nonpublic schools,"
and to help relieve an overburdened public school system were suf-
ficiently secular to satisfy the first part of the establishment clause
test. Id. at 773.
39. Id. at 793. The finding of entanglement in Nyquist seemed to
be a departure from prior case law. The tax credit scheme in Nyquist
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tax exemption statute at issue in Walz, the statute in Nyquist
was only recently enacted.
40
Measuring the Gotlieb concurrence's test of deductibility
against the established criteria of constitutionality leads inevi-
tably to the conclusion that the test is impermissible. It is diffi-
cult to imagine, and the concurrence did not suggest, a secular
purpose for applying a more liberal standard of deductibility to
payments made for Talmud Torah tuition but not to payments
made for parochial school tuition,41 or to other qualified reci-
did not require the government to deal with the religious organizations
themselves or their employees, but directly with individual taxpayers.
In the past, the Court had indicated that proscribed government en-
tanglement would arise only in the context of government transactions
with the religious organizations, see Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664 (1970) (the elimination of tax exemptions for religious organizations
may subject them to excessive involvement with the state because of
tax liens or tax foreclosures); or with their employees, see Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 367-73 (1975) (statute authorizing the state to
provide professional staff to nonpublic schools); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 756 (1973) (statute providing for the payment of salary sup-
plement to teachers in nonpublic elementary schools). In discussing a
state's program of lending books to individual students, however, the
Court did not even consider the entanglement issue, see Meek v. Pitten-
ger, 421 U.S. at 359-62. The Court did not fully explore this issue in
Nyquist and it remains unclear how the indirect aid to parents consti-
tuted government entanglement. Nevertheless, the Nyquist holding
would seem to control the analogous situation that would be posed by
application of the Gotlieb concurrence's test of tax deductibility.
40. The Court admitted, however, that "historical acceptance with-
out more would not alone have sufficed." 413 U.S. at 792. See also
note 35 supra.
41. This discussion assumes the constitutionality of tax deduc-
tions for gifts made to religious organizations under the charitable
contribution deduction statute. For the relevant text of the Minnesota
statute, see note 2 supra. This assumption has already been made by
at least three Supreme Court justices, see Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 807 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting in part, joined by Burger, C.J., and White, J.). Like the
tax exemption statute upheld in Walz, the federal charitable contribu-
tion deduction statute has a long history, having been enacted shortly
after the sixteenth amendment was ratified. War Revenue Act of 1917,
ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 330. Minnesota's statute, which is virtually
identical to the federal statute, was enacted in 1933, 1933 Minn. Laws
ch. 405, § 27(f), the same year in which the legislature first imposed a
state income tax. In addition, like the statute upheld in Walz, the char-
itable contribution deduction provisions are broad and include many
kinds of organizations. Elimination of these tax deductions for gifts to
religious organizations, however, would not result in the excessive gov-
ernment entanglement with religion, such as tax valuation of church
property, tax liens, and tax foreclosures, that the Walz Court foresaw as
the result of eliminating tax exemptions to churches.
On the other hand, the tax benefit statute struck down in Nyquist,
see note 37 supra, can be distinguished in that, unlike the charitable
19771
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pients of tax deductible contributions. Moreover, even assuming
that a valid secular justification for the limitation could be of-
fered, the concurrence's test is nonetheless analytically indistin-
guishable from the tax credits held unconstitutional in Nyquist.
First, the Gotieb test would only affect the deductibility of
transfers made to a narrow class of recipients distinguished by
their purely religious character. Thus, the requirement would
more clearly have the effect of advancing religion than the statute
in Nyquist, which applied to tuition payments made to any non-
public school, a few of which offered purely secular education.
Application of the test would also appear to produce state in-
volvement in religion to the same extent that the tax benefit
statute in Nyquist did.42 Finally, the judicial interpretation is
recent, a factor that appears to militate against constitutionality
in establishment clause cases. 4 3 Thus, insofar as the Gotlieb con-
currence implies that a different test will be applied to payments
to organizations providing purely religious educational services
than to payments to other qualified recipients of tax deductible
contributions, such an application would appear to violate the
establishment clause. It would have no clear secular purpose,
and the primary effect of its application in advancing religion
appears indistinguishable from the primary effect of the statute
struck down in Nyquist.
Perhaps the overriding concern of the justices concurring in
Gotlieb4 4 was the seeming unfairness of allowing deductions for
the full amount of contributions made to churches where the tax-
payer's children attend Sunday school, with no reduction for the
reasonable value of the educational services received, while
denying comparable deductions to parents of Talmud Torah
students.45 The rule proposed by the Gotlieb concurrence was
contribution deduction statute, it was recently enacted, and applied only
to nonpublic schools, most of which are sectarian.
Thus, although the constitutionality of tax deductions for gifts to
religious organizations has not been determined expressly, see Com-
mittee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 790
n.49 (1973), the better view is that Walz controls, and the deductions are
constitutional.
42. See note 39 supra.
43. See notes 35 & 40 supra.
44. The majority opinion also evinced this concern. 245 N.W.2d at
246-47.
45. See id. at 247. In view of the Commissioner's express sanction
of the deduction for religious contributions in the form of pew rents or
periodic dues paid into the general fund of a church, Rev. Rul. 47, 1970-1
C.B. 49, it is unlikely that courts will ever disallow deductions for dona-
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undoubtedly an attempt to ensure the same tax treatment for
both classes of payments. 46 As a matter of tax law, however,
there are fundamental differences between ordinary Sunday
schools and Talmud Torah schools. Under the Duberstein-De-
Jong standard, it is doubtful that the anticipation of a child's Sun-
day school education would, as a factual matter, be found to be
"a substantial inducement" 47 to a parent for his payment to a
church's general fund. A parent would be unlikely to increase
his payments to the church 6r begin to make payments simply
because he had a child in Sunday school. The payments to the
Talmud Torah school, however, apparently are paid only when
the parent has a child attending the school.
In this respect, payments to the Talmud Torah school are
more akin to tuition paid to parochial schools48 or payments made
to a church or synagogue in direct exchange for such services as
a wedding49 or a Bas Mitzvah,?° payments for which deductions
have been denied. Conversely, if the Talmud Torah were fi-
nanced from the general donations made to synagogues, rather
than by assessing tuition payments directly from parents of stu-
dents, the parents could probably deduct the full amount of their
contributions. Such a solution, of course, looks suspiciously like
tions to the extent that they are offset by the reasonable value of Sunday
school.
46. The only court that has considered why deductions for pay-
ments to churches are not disallowed, even though the taxpayer appar-
ently anticipates various services in return, attempted to resolve the
dilemma by distinguishing "incidental" from "direct" benefits received
by the taxpayer. Thus, a deduction would be allowed for payments to
a church because the "services and other benefits" received by the tax-
payer, even if anticipated, were not "direct." Edward A. Murphy, 54
T.C. 249, 253 (1970).
The court in Murphy would allow the deduction when the taxpayer
anticipated a benefit that was "merely incidental to making the organi-
zation function according to its charitable purpose" and consisted only
of "the satisfaction of participating in the furtherance of its charitable
or religious cause." Id. at 253. The standard suggested by the Service
and adopted by most courts, however, is whether the benefit is "inci-
dental" "in comparison to the benefits accruing to the public at large."
Rev. Rul. 446, 1967-2 C.B. 119, 120. See, e.g., United States v. Transamer-
ica Corp., 392 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1968); Singer Co. v. United States,
449 F.2d 413, 423 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Harold E. Wolfe, 54 T.C. 1707 (1970).
47. See note 16 supra.
48. See Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972);
Winters v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972); DeJong v. Com-
missioner, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962).
49. See James Summers, 43 T.C.M. (P-H) 74,162 (1974) (dis-
allowing deduction based on payment for use of church hall for a wed-
ding).




a distinction of form rather than of substance. Yet as the Min-
nesota court explained in Gotlieb,
If a taxpayer's remittances to a qualifying organization are
used for the same purpose in either case, it may seem at first
an exaltation of form over substance to allow a deduction for
those payments which are gifts or contributions, yet allow no
deduction for those payments which are not gifts or contribu-
tions. As is so often necessary in tax laws, however, Minn. St.
29021 gives special significance to the form of the payment.51
Thus, although the rule proposed by the concurrence was a well-
intentioned attempt to make the charitable deduction provisions
of the Minnesota statute appear to operate more fairly, the re-
sults under such a standard would be unacceptable as a matter
of tax law, statutory interpretation, or constitutional principle.
It should not be viewed as authoritative in any future cases
arising under Minnesota Statutes section 290.21.
51. 245 N.W.2d at 247 (emphasis added).
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